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Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca have both been recognized for their tireless efforts on behalf of 
Jews: Perelman, himself a Jew, was praised for his work with the Jewish Resistance group, the Comité de la 
Défense des Juifs [CDJ], which was founded in his living room in June 1942; he was also noted for his 
postwar activities, including the Aliyah Bet movement immediately following the war.2 Olbrechts-Tyteca, for 
her part, was honored as one of the ‘Righteous among the Nations’ by Yad Vashem in 1980 for her work on 
the Comité des Marraines [Godmother Committee] founded by Fela Perelman, which hid Belgian Jewish 
children during the second World War.3 
 The present study does not have Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work on behalf of the Jews as its 
subject; this has been amply described elsewhere (by, among others, Frank 1997, 2003, 2004, 2014; Steinberg 
1978; Gross and Dearin 2003). It is rather an exploration of how they (and Perelman in particular) translate 
their experiences (direct and indirect) of anti-Semitism into the philosophical meditations of the Traité and the 
other writings that make up the New Rhetoric Project [NRP].4 If, as Amos Kiewe has pointed out, 
“scholarship on anti-Semitism from a rhetorical perspective is almost none existent” (vii), scholarship on the 
NRP’s response to anti-Semitism is, to date, slim.  
My colleague David Frank has cogently unearthed the Jewish foundations of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s magnum opus, the Traité de l’argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique (1958), and the way in 
which Talmudic reasoning is an important feature of the type of argumentation it formulates. If Frank’s work 
suggests the link between Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Resistance activities and their search for a logic 
of value judgments, to date there has not been any discussion of how the Traité—or the NRP more broadly—
responds to anti-Semitism. But frankly, any such discussion would be a difficult enterprise, because allusions 
to anti-Semitism are elusive in the Traité. In fact, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca take on the question of 
assimilation rather than the outright and violent acts of anti-Semitism; even this in the Traité tends to be 
implicit.5 As a result, in order to understand the NRP as a response to anti-Semitism, we must ferret out 
nuanced references to assimilation in the Traité, and, more importantly, look to other more overt statements 
on assimilation in the additional materials—articles, lectures, and even notebooks—that comprise the NRP.  
Readers of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work, especially in North America, who most often 
come to the NRP through the 1969 English translation of the Traité may find the premise that it overtly 
responds to anti-Semitism, or even to assimilation, surprising, even if, as Susan Handelman has insightfully 
remarked, Perelman’s rhetoric is “dependent upon a relation to an other” (602). This response is not, on the 
surface, wrong, for the Traité does not explicitly treat either assimilation or anti-Semitism, nor does it overtly 
promote argumentation as a means of combatting the latter; nowhere in its pages do Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca make reference to their work to support and save Jews during and immediately following 
																																																								
1 Article forthcoming in Journal of Communication and Religion : Special Issue Confronting Anti-Semitism: A Rhetorical and Critical 
Response 39:2 (2016): 22-35. 
2 As a part of this movement, in July 1946, Perelman and his wife Fela organized a boat for the immigration of Jews to Palestine, 
which was illegal at the time. See Michman 527. I would also point out that Perelman was also an important member of the UNESCO 
Committee of Experts on the Philosophical Principles of the Rights of Man convened in Paris in 1947. 
3 See Michman on Fela’s activities hiding children (esp. 248, 310). 
4 This is not to say, of course, that Olbrechts-Tyteca as a non-Jew had a first-hand experience of anti-Semitism, nor that Perelman 
experienced anti-Semitism only during the Occupation, particularly since he had been in Warsaw studying logic precisely when the 
ghetto benches were instituted. 
5 If, as we will see, Perelman considers assimilation as a demand imposed on the Jews by the community in which they are a minority 
and thus as a form of anti-Semitism, other more recent scholars see it as a danger internal to the Jewish community. Dershowitz, for 
example, begins his work on the disappearing Jew in the United States by writing: “The good news is that American Jews—as 
individuals—have never been more secure, more accepted, more affluent, and less victimized by discrimination or anti-Semitism. The 
bad news is that American Jews—as a people—have never been in greater danger of disappearing through assimilation, intermarriage, 
and low birthrates” (1). 
the war, even if anecdotes from the Belgian Occupation do appear.6 In fact, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
make but a single reference to Adolf Hitler within their exploration of how terms function within 
philosophical pairs. In this example, they explicate the term “eternal”: 
The adjective ‘eternal’ thus designates a term II [of a philosophical pair]: for the 
Germans who were opponents of the Third Reich, ‘eternal Germany’ was the true 
Germany, in opposition to Nazi Germany, thus described as transitory and 
apparent. For Hitler, however, when joined to ‘Germany’, this adjective was only a 
form of the superlative. (Traité 587; New Rhetoric 4427) 
This allusion surprises for its even-handed, rather detached tone, all the while illustrating how the meaning of 
a term II of a philosophical pair is unstable, changing in time and according to the audience that holds it as 
valuable. In choosing this particular example to disclose how dissociation can affect the nature of the second 
term, so that here “eternal” is in fact anything but, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do more than elide 
“eternal” to “appearance” and thus to the philosophical pair of appearance/reality.8 In fact, with this 
example, which obviously indicates a postwar perspective, they delicately establish here an image of Germany 
that conflicts with that held by, and associated with, Hitler; they deny the notion that Germany is to be 
eternally equated with the Third Reich. We can easily imagine how they, and Perelman in particular, might 
have been personally invested in the dissociation of Nazism from Germany: Germany had much to offer to 
such a cosmopolitan philosopher as Perelman, who had written his dissertation on the German philosopher 
Gottlob Frege, and who directly after the end of the war had insisted upon visiting Germany.9 Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s reference to Germany in relation to eternal as an example of how the meaning of a term 
within a philosophical pair can change is thus marked by traces—although curiously impassive—of their real-
life experiences of both the Germany lauded for its philosophical and philological prowess, and the Germany 
associated with the Hitlerian Totalitarianism they had experienced under the Occupation. It is, however, 
hardly an impassioned declaration against anti-Semitism.  
The emotional restraint with which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca make reference to Hitler, Nazi 
Germany, and the Third Reich is also remarkably evident in an early Belgian review of the Traité by Isaye 
Gaston. When Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca clarify that they fight against philosophical oppositions and 
absolutisms by employing the term combattre, Gaston pauses in his analysis in order to deny that this term and, 
by extension the Traité as a whole, is aggressive. He writes, “If the authors show some emotion here, it is 
because they fight only to defend, in order to protect eminently respectable human convictions that are 
perfectly reasonable even it they are not analyzed or even able to be analyzed in a purely formalist system” 
(641). Uneasy, Gaston posits the threat of violence underlying their use of combattre as purely defensive; he 
thus seems to insist upon reading combattre in the very same understated, even muted fashion that we have 
seen used by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca themselves in the example above. 
But Gaston is all too ready to minimize the political subtext of the sentence in which combattre 
appears (as combattons). The sentence in question—“We fight against the categorical and intransigent 
philosophical oppositions that every type of absolutism presents to us” [Nous combattons les oppositions 
philosophiques, tranchées et irréductibles, que nous présentent les absolutismes de toute espèce” (Traité 676; 
New Rhetoric 510)]—is significant semantically, for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca use terms whose lexical 
valence calls to mind the French Revolution for the careful reader of the French original.10 At first reading, 
tranchée evokes not the figurative ‘categorical’ as I have translated it above but rather the more literal ‘cut’ 
because of its syntactic bond with absolutisme, which refers to systems of government in which the ruler holds 																																																								
6 See, in particular, the section § 38 on verbal forms, in which they discuss the use of the term “boche” used at the time, and the 
anecdote of the ninety-year-old aristocrat’s punning retort to the German general who had expropriated her house. Traité 201, 204; 
New Rhetoric 149, 151. 
7 I provide references to Wilkinson and Weaver’s English translation of the Traité for the reader’s convenience; however, all 
translations of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work here (including the Traité, but not the New Rhetoric and the Humanities) are mine. 
8 In her 1979 article “Les Couples philosophiques”, Olbrechts-Tyteca pairs “approximation” with “eternity” (84). 
9 See Crosswhite’s anecdote, which records Perelman commenting that the devastated Germany he saw was “not Europe.” See 
Crosswhite, 136. 
10 A more neutral translation of combattons in this sentence could have been “are opposed to,” which would erase the allusion to 
revolution all together; Wilkinson and Weaver use the lexically related “combat,” which has an element of abstraction missing in 
“fight against.” 
divine power without the limits imposed by constitutional laws, as was established in France by Louis XIV.11 
As a result, tranchée evokes the guillotine, and absolutisme, the absolute, divine power of the king that was so 
violently contested—combatted—during the French Revolution.12 The French Revolution thus underlies this 
phrase, and Gaston, a Jesuit priest and professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium), was 
perhaps (with reason) eager to abate the underlying allusion to the French Revolution, insisting on Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s use of combattre as illustrating their defense of philosophical flexibility and nuance.13   
A reader aware of what the French Revolution meant for Jews in particular may read this same 
sentence with an additional, more contemporary, and for the purposes of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
Traité, more relevant resonance, for it carries with it the question of assimilation. Let me clarify. Emancipation 
of the Jews was for some, particularly Mirabeau and the Abbé Gregoire, a Revolutionary goal, and the decree 
of 27 September 1791 emancipated the Jews, recognizing for the first time in law the Jews as full-fledged 
French citizens.14  However, the universalism espoused by the French Revolution simultaneously denied the 
possibility of plurality, and for the Jews, of retaining their religion and cultural traditions.15 As Perelman writes 
in 1979, “In order to be able, under the guidance of reason, to share the same truths, men also forget their 
beliefs and creeds, the heritage of history, tradition and culture, all equally disqualified as prejudices. This 
would be the utopia of the universal society based on reason, the avowed ideal of the French Revolution” 
(New Rhetoric and the Humanities 69–70). The legal recognition of the Jews thus prompted the beginning of the 
difficult dilemma that was Jewish assimilation; for Arthur Hertzberg, the recognition of a legal status for the 
Jews did not constitute an unqualified triumph, but rather, the seeds of anti-Semitism.16 As a result, the lexical 
valence of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concluding thoughts in the Traité that make Gaston so 
uncomfortable—their opposition to (and their combat against) philosophical absolutism—thus also suggests 
the weight of the universalist ideals of the French Revolution and the burden of assimilation inscribed 
therein. As Hannah Arendt declares “Assimilation is the entrance of the Jews into the historical European 
world” (“Original Assimilation” in The Jewish Writings 22).17 We can conclude, then, that one of the forms of 
absolutism that they reject in the Traité is universalism’s historical requirement of Jews to assimilate.  
To be fair, few readers would draw so much meaning from one sentence among many in the Traité; it 
is, after all, 733 pages long, and the French Revolution does not figure therein.18 However, the reader of the 																																																								
11 Here, I recall I.A. Richards, who writes, “A word may be simultaneously both literal and metaphoric, just as it may simultaneously 
support many different metaphors, may serve to focus into one meaning many different meanings” (118-19). 
12 A sensitive reader might also go so far as to associate their description of absolutism with the Totalitarian system and its absolute 
ruler—Hitler—under whose rule they lived during the Occupation. 
13 Curiously, Gaston was known for the formation of an argumentation of retaliation [l’argumentation par rétorision]. See Jean 
Ladrière’s memorializing preface to Gaston’s L’Affirmation de l’être, see 19-21. Gaston may have had first-hand experience of 
retaliation, practiced particularly between in August 1914 by the Germans against Belgian citizens considered to be snipers. In 
addition, the library of the Catholic University of Louvain where Gaston worked for decades was entirely destroyed by fire twice, in 
August 1914 and again in May 1940. See Lousse’s volume of the history of the Catholic University of Louvain. See Berkovitz on the 
various formulations of ‘émancipation’, and its three-fold evolution (57-78) 
14 The exhaustive La Révolution française et l'émancipation des juifs contains the many decrees aimed at Jews, as well as at Blacks, and other 
populations on the margins of French society (see esp. volume 7, which records the debates—including comments by the Abbé 
Grégoire and Mirabeau—and the accompanying documents of the Assemblée Nationale on the emancipation of the Jews). Badinter 
usefully notes the plurality of Jewish communities at the time, which renders the ‘Jewish Question’ more complex than one might 
otherwise imagine. Berkovitz cogently argues that the French Revolution was the first and the most important, but not the only, 
factor that left an important mark on Jewish consciousness ; moreover, he explores how the concept of régénération, which marked the 
idea of emancipation, was understood radically by the French, who expected a secular rebirth and a rupture with the past, and much 
less radically by Jews in France, who saw it as holding promise of a restoration of Jewish traditions and identity (45–48). I would recall 
that the Abbé Grégoire was the author of the important Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des juifs (1789). 
15 I am well aware that the French Revolution of 1789 went through many phases and, as Szajkowski’s titles indicates, there were in 
fact a series of “French Revolutions.” 
16 As Szajkowski describes, even after the Terror (i.e, after 1794), anti-Semitism was widespread. 422–33. Berkovitz describes the 
precarious, and impoverished, situation of Jewish communities in Alsace-Lorraine following the Revolution (49–56). Marrus, on the 
other hand, shows how late nineteenth-century Jews in France developed a theory of ‘Franco-Judaism’ deriving from the French 
Revolution and its emancipation, even redemption, of the Jews (86-121). 
17 Arendt’s essay is titled in full “Original Assimilation: An Epilogue to the One Hundredth Anniversary of Rachel Varnhagen’s 
death” (The Jewish Writings, 22-30). 
18 However, scholars do employ the Traité in order to analyze the French Revolution; Rigney applies the Traité’s rhetoric as a means to 
qualify Lamartine’s historical account of the insurrection of 10 August 1792 Revolution as rhetorical (esp. 73-75). 
original French Traité immediately recognizes the polysemy of this sentence that troubles Gaston, 
understanding that underneath such terms as combattons, tranchée, and absolutisme lies the vast history of the 
French Revolution and its mixed consequences for Jews. Indeed, for our purposes, this reference to the 
French Revolution is significant, for it helps us to sketch out the outlines of the Traité as a response to the 
Enlightenment’s peculiar form of anti-Semitism, assimilation.19  
Reading the French Revolution as tied to, and a symbol of, assimilation for Perelman will perhaps 
make more sense when we realize that he was acutely interested in the questions of liberty and the rights of 
citizens that the Revolution posed. His notebooks, for example, show him reading and taking notes from Jean 
Belin’s 1939 La logique d’une idée-force: l’idée d’utilité sociale et la révolution française.20 In his notes, Perelman draws 
conclusions from Belin’s work that will later inform his work on law (he sees, for instance, an evolution of 
liberty, which, at first an exception, becomes a rule and then a legal obligation); moreover, he takes care to 
note both Berlin’s vision of the French Revolution as a reversal of earlier conceptions of particular liberties 
(i.e., privileges accorded based on social status) and, moreover, Belin’s association of liberty with equality, the 
well-known motto of France deriving from the French Revolution.21 Perelman’s notes on Belin’s work 
suggest, then, that the French Revolution holds epistemological importance for him; it marks not only the 
ideals of the Enlightenment with which Perelman is philosophically engaged (i.e., not only liberty and equality 
but also formal reasoning and logical positivism), but also his personal preoccupation with the problem of 
assimilation.  
The Traité’s allusion to the French Revolution is thus a subtle means of evoking the drama of 
assimilation. If after the French Revolution, assimilation had ambiguous consequences for the Jews—who 
gained legal rights at the price of losing their religion and culture—it was an even more pressing (and in many 
ways less ambiguous) issue in the 1930s. Hannah Arendt, writing in 1935, manifests the exigency felt by Jews 
to work out the question of assimilation: “The question of or success or failure of assimilation is more urgent 
than ever precisely for assimilated Jews. For assimilation is a fact, and only later, in the context of defensive 
struggle, does it become an ideology; an ideology one today knows cannot maintain itself because reality has 
refuted it more fully and unambiguously than ever before (“Original Assimilation” in The Jewish Writings 22). 
Even prior to the war Arendt expresses the increasing sentiment that assimilation has not, and would not, 
work out in the Jews’ favor. Her conclusion a few years later is definitive: assimilation is not only impractical, 
but is to be equated to the Jews’ extinction:  “Only assimilation on an international scale, which would be 
tantamount to the disappearance of the Jews, or a social order that knows no opposing international interests 
could put an end to the fact that there are differences of interests” (“Antisemitism” in The Jewish Writings 51).22 
The Traité includes at least one instance, if implicit, that points to the question of assimilation. 
Consider Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s contrast of the two different forms of argument construction, 
hypotactic versus paratactic (§39). David Frank has perceptively argued that the paratactic construction of 
argument derives from a Hebrew model of argumentation, unveiling how Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
privilege it over the Greek and Roman preference for the hypotactic, in part because the paratactic insists 
upon the notion of liberty (“Jewish Countermodel” 177–78).23 Their presentation of the two forms of 
argumentation is indeed important for discerning how the paratactic is of Hebrew origin, offering a vision of 																																																								
19 As Arendt asserted in 1938, “Assimilation always meant assimilation to the Enlightenment” (“Original Assimilation” in The Jewish 
Writings 22). Arendt later identifies assimilation as a problem that begins in the time of the French Revolution: “But the problem of 
Jewish assimilation begins only after the Enlightenment, first in the generation followed Mendelssohn [d. 1786]” (“Original 
Assimilation” in The Jewish Writings 23). 
20 See the notebook he had begun in May 1935. Archives Perelman 89 PP 12, carnet 7, pp. 116–117. 
21 In fact, Belin notes (as Perelman records on p. 117 of this notebook), liberty can only be operative in a field of action if there is 
equality. 
22 Part of the problem, Arendt notes, is a denial of particularity and difference in the population at large. She writes, “All theories that 
see Jewish salvation in assimilation are based on an assumption that the host people are unified, undifferentiated, so that Jews would 
become German citizens but of Jewish faith” (“Antisemitism” in The Jewish Writings 53). 
23 Traité 213 [New Rhetoric 158]: “La construction hypotactique est la construction argumentative par excellence: elle serait selon 
Auerbach—par opposition à la construction paratactique propore à la culture hébraïque—caractéristique des écrits gréco-romains. 
L’hypotaxe crée des cadres, constitue une prise de position. Elle commande au lecteur, l’oblige à voir certaines relations, limite les 
interprétations qu’il pourrait prendre en considération, s’inspire du raisonnement juridique bien construit. La parataxe laisse plus de 
liberté, ne semble vouloir imposer aucun point de vue….”  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s rhetoric as Jewish. Moreover, when we look more closely at their reasoning, 
we also see how the question of assimilation is embedded in their depiction of hypotaxis. That is, their 
description of hypotactic construction of argument depends upon the example of how a fourth-century 
Roman emperor who had renounced religion treated the Jews of his realm. As they write, “This is how the 
benevolent clemency of Julian the Apostate was curiously shown toward the Jews: “They [the Jews] are 
compatible [i.e., they fit in] with the Gentiles, except for their belief in a single God, which is particular to 
them, and foreign to us. All the rest we have in common” (Traité 211–12; New Rhetoric 157).24 This example 
thus poses in plain sight the question of Jewish assimilation in the Traité, even if it situates it in the far-off, late 
Roman past; it also suggests that the way in which assimilated Jews were treated by their host cultures could 
be arbitrary, depending on a ruler’s politics or personality.25 
Although the Traité compels readers to analyze the question of assimilation in something of a hide-
and-seek manner, assimilation was central for Perelman, as much a personal as an ideological issue. As a 
Zionist who refused to leave his adopted country of Belgium in the years leading up to the Belgian 
Occupation and even after the creation of the State of Israel, Perelman grappled personally and 
philosophically with the notion of assimilation. But we must look beyond the boundaries of the Traité to 
acknowledge just how important assimilation is in Perelman’s broader philosophical endeavor. In 1935 he 
published a short essay on assimilation in La Tribune juive entitled “Reflections on Assimilation’ [“Reflexions 
sur l’assimilation”]; he wrote a second, unpublished essay by the same name sometime after 1948, and 
continued to lecture on the subject into the early 1960s.26 Despite their similarity in title and subject matter, 
these works are not identical; indeed, they provide not only a means for understanding the evolution of 
Perelman’s thought on assimilation, but also the necessary background for understanding the Traité’s veiled 
allusions to it. 
In his 1935 article on assimilation, Perelman distinguishes two different types of assimilation: the 
first, demanded by others, is marked as individual and highly psychological in nature; the second, the form of 
which one chooses, is the assimilation of a group rather than an individual, and thus sociological in nature.27 
The first, based on an unreasonable obligation to be pleasing to many different people at the same time, is 
ultimately impossible and essentially auto-destructive. According to this formulation, assimilation is when 
others require us not simply to be one thing or another, but instead, no longer to exist, to disappear, in order 
to be pleasing (or at least, not to be displeasing) to them.28 Given that he writes in 1935, Perelman’s portrayal 
of this type of assimilation is prescient and chilling: to assimilate in this way means “being a follower of any 
doctrine, of any ideal which allows you to disappear, in order to disappear. Living incognito and, if this is 
impossible, showing a false passport. Eternally hunted, trembling at the sound of your own name. And, 
finally, being discovered, accused of treason, of using false papers. Being vomited out like an insidious 
poison, yes poison, because insidious. Must a gentleman hide himself so much?”29    																																																								
24 Traité 211–12 [New Rhetoric 157]: “Voilà comment reflète curieusement la bienveillante indulgence de Julien l’Apostate envers les 
juifs: ‘Ils s’accordent avec les gentils, à l’exception de leur croyance en un seul Dieu. Cela leur est spécial et nous est étranger. Tout le 
reste nous est commun….” Adler describes Julian’s clemency as regards the Jews as remarkable, as he was known for his hatred of 
Christians. 
25 This is suggested, I think, by their use of “curieusement” preceding “la bienveillante indulgence.” 
26 The undated essay, “Réflections sur l’assimilation”, and the lecture note cards, entitled “Rationalisme et assimilation” are included in 
89 PP 17.4 of the Archives Perelman, Université Libre de Bruxelles. I thank Prof. Emmanuelle Danblon and Ingrid Mayeur for 
making the consultation of these materials possible. The 1935 article will appear in English as a part of the NEH-sponsored 
translation and commentary on which Professor David Frank and I are currently working. 
27 If Perelman’s sociological perspective may have been influenced by Dupréel’s Le pluralisme sociologique (see his “Philosophy of 
Pluralism” in The New Rhetoric and the Humanities, 63–65), it was also a response to Bernstein’s work on the Jewish question, which 
makes use of a sociological approach but, as Perelman laments in his review of Bernstein’s work that appeared in the July 1935 issue 
of La Tribune juive (“Une conception sociologique de la question juive”), one marked by a deductive, and thus far too abstract, method 
(52).  
28 Perelman writes, “…on exigera de nous, pour ne pas déplaire, non pas d’être tel ou tel, mais de ne plus être; de disparaître pour 
plaire.”  
29 “Réflections sur l’assimilation” (1935): “Être partisan de toutes les doctrines, de tous les idéaux permettant de se perdre, pour se 
perdre. Vivre incognito et, si c’est impossible, exhiber un faux passeport. Eternel traqué, trembler au son de son nom qui est le sien. 
Et, enfin, être découvert, accusé de trahison, d’usage de faux papiers. Être vomi comme un posion insidieux: oui posion, parce que 
insidieux. Un honnête homme a-t-il besoin de tant se cacher?”  
 The second form of assimilation, on the other hand, is open-ended, and Perelman declares that to 
assimilate for oneself is to choose to live a better life; it is to choose the form in which one’s belonging to the 
group that is Judaism will take.30 However, it is clear that Perelman advocates assimilating as a Jew aware of, 
and adhering to, the traditional spiritual values of Judaism; while it is possible to deny one’s Judaism, he says, 
it is only an assimilation that is limited to the values that are allowed by Judaism, and whose adoption will not 
betray Jewish values, that can be enriching and productive.31 He concludes this article on a note of glory: to 
assimilate in this way means fully belonging to one’s social group. As a result, it means “fully knowing, 
studying, appreciating, and exalting Jewish ideology by affirming the value of Jewish culture and what Jews 
have given to the world; it means affirming proudly and gloriously the fact of belonging to the group that is 
Judaism, such that all Jews will respect this Jewish honor.”32   
 In this early consideration of assimilation, then, Perelman uses both sociology and psychology as a 
means of promoting a rather peculiar form of assimilation.33 That is, he contrasts the traditional form of 
assimilation posited by the Enlightenment values sketched out by the French Revolution—in which everyone 
must adhere to values deemed as universal (and which may thus be opposed to particular values), and 
everyone must adopt a single identity, that of the ideal vision of the majority—by proposing that there are at 
least two forms of assimilation. More important, he suggests that the second form allows, even depends 
upon, belonging to a particular group. In fact, he warns that even if a man is unaware, or disdainful, of his 
Jewish heritage, he will remain Jewish by virtue of belonging to the social group that is Judaism.34 Written in 
1935, this essay charges the readers of the Tribune juive to remake, even reinvent, assimilation so that it 
comprises and honors Jewish values; assimilation in this light may no longer be a form of anti-Semitism in 
which Jews must deny Judaism in order to please the non-Jewish culture within which they live. 
Here I must pause to acknowledge that Perelman’s writings on assimilation are very much tied to the 
idea of the “Jewish Question,” initially posed by Theodor Herzl in 1896, and on which Arendt wrote 
frequently in the 1930s.35 Arendt’s vision of the Jewish Question is useful in that it foregrounds how 
assimilation and anti-Semitism are keys to understanding the Jewish Question. In 1932 Arendt posits the 
origins of the Jewish Question to the Enlightenment (“The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question” in The 
Jewish Writings 3).36 A few years later, Arendt characterizes the Jewish Question as one of assimilation: “The 
Jewish question is a genuine question or a genuine problem—which means that there can be historical 
solutions—wherever truly large masses of people reside in the midst of another people from whom they are 
clearly set off by custom, wardrobe, the monopolization of certain professions, and historical development” 
(“The Jewish Question” in The Jewish Writings 44).37  
Perelman’s article of the same name appeared in 1946; it was, after his book on justice, one of the 
first postwar articles he published. Like Arendt, he posits the Jewish Question as a very genuine, even urgent 
problem with a specific set of solutions—to settle homeless Jewish victims of Hitler’s persecution in the only 																																																								
30 “Réflections sur l’assimilation” (1935): “S’assimiler, à cause de soi, pour vivre une plus belle vie. En abandonnant sa personalité ou 
en l’amplifiant; en délaissant ce qu’on possède de spécifiquement juif en soi, ou en l’enrichissant.” 
31 “Réflections sur l’assimilation” (1935): “cette assimiliation ne peut s’appliquer qu’aux valeurs tolérées par le judaïsme, celles que l’on 
peut adopter sans trahir ses propres valeurs juives.” 
32 “Réflections sur l’assimilation” (1935): “Qu’il faut donc connaître, étudier, apprécier, exalter, en affirmant la valeur de la culture 
juive, de l’idéologie juive, de l’apport des Juifs au monde des humains. Et en affirmant son appartenance au groupe juif, fièrement, 
glorieusement, en faisant respecter l’honneur juif, reflet de la valeur du groupe juif dans chacun de ses membres.” 
33 Handelman’s analysis of Perelman’s ‘third way’—a rhetorical way out of the philosophical dualisms enshrined by the 
Enlightenment—is useful here (602–603). 
34 “Réflections sur l’assimilation” (1935): “... même si on ignore ou méprise l’idéologie et les valeurs spirituelles du judaïsme, on reste 
encore Juif par un autre aspect de sa personnalité, l’aspect social, celui où il ne s’agit pas d’idées, mais de groupes.” 
35 It might be useful to recall that Perelman grew up with a portrait of Herzl hanging on the wall. See Frank, “Jewish Rhetoric” 80. 
Herzl used this phrase, “The Jewish Question”, to describe how Jews might survive complete annihilation; a Zionist, Herzl proposed 
the creation of a secular Jewish state. 
36 “The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question,” written in 1932, in The Jewish Writings, 2–18. 
37 “The Jewish Question”, written in 1937 or 1938, in The Jewish Writings 42-45. In this article, Arendt argues that Jews on the whole 
are not interested in dealing with anti-Semitism, but rather with teshuva, or repentance, which she characterizes as a return to the 
Jewish ghetto. Further, she suggests that the Jewish question is only raised in industrially underdeveloped countries where there is a 
significant population of Jews with legal rights and some social and economic power; the “Jewish Question” according to the 
characterization, should not be applied to 1933 Germany, but rather to a country such as Poland.  
country willing to accept them, Palestine, and to abolish the British “White Paper” of 1939, which made such 
immigration illegal.38  However, Perelman’s “Jewish Question” differs from that of Arendt’s on several levels: 
first, it proposes what may be called a sociological view of anti-Semitism, defining the conflict between Jews 
and Christians as one of competing groups.39 As Perelman writes, “In fact, anti-Semitism is only one 
particular case of a very widespread phenomenon: group opposition. It is a distinctive feature of any social 
group, whatever it may be, to object to other groups, especially those that are of the same type. We have 
pointed to the particular case of the opposition of Christianity to Judaism, but this phenomenon appears 
frequently not only among religious groups, but also among national, professional, sporting groups, etc.” 
(55).40 Second, unlike Arendt, Perelman in this article provides a lengthy diachronic and historical analysis as a 
frame through which to grasp how the Jewish Question is still, in 1946, a concern despite the victory over 
Nazism.41 Perelman thus argues that the Jewish present is tied to the past by the same kind of inter-group 
conflict and anti-Semitism that Jews have witnessed for centuries.42  
But Perelman does not rest with this conclusion that the Jewish Question is and has always been 
sociological in nature. Again, he poses it as a very specific and pressing postwar problem: where are Jewish 
refugees, and particularly those from Eastern Europe, to go, now that they are homeless and effectively 
stateless? Given the urgency of the situation, and how involved Perelman was after the war in the clandestine 
passage of Jewish refugees to Palestine, it is not surprising that the tenor of his conclusion is quite emotional: 
“From every camp in Europe, across every border, thousands of refugees flow toward the banks of the 
Promised Land. They have nothing left to lose, and Palestine constitutes their only hope. The English have 
mobilized a large part of their Navy to chase these small boats that bring desperate Jews from all over to the 
country of their ancestors. The boats are confiscated, the people are sent to camps in Cyprus, but the flood 
continues....” (63).43 For readers accustomed to the dry, detached tone of the Traité, Perelman’s impassioned 
description here is surprising; the striking final ellipsis lends even greater urgency to his plea. Perelman’s 
article on the Jewish Question is thus an emotional expression of the devastating consequences of 
institutionalized anti-Semitism.  
 Despite the emotional power of its plea to open Palestine to Jewish emigration, “The Jewish 
Question” is also a circumspect exploration of assimilation. Indeed, Perelman specifically situates the roots of 
this problem in the late nineteenth century, locating assimilation in Western Europe, and Zionism—the result 
of the impossibility to assimilate—in Eastern Europe.44 Such a move recalls how Arendt in 1935 linked the 																																																								
38 “La Question juive” 61-62: “Le seul pays qui était prêt à leur offrir un asile définitif était la Palestine, mais les dispositions du Livre 
Blanc de 1939 n’en accordaient plus l’entrée qu’à quelques dizaines de milliers de personnes…. […] La politique du Livre Blanc allait-
elle se perpétuer? Comment pouvait-on considérer que la Palestine devait fournir aux Juifs un Foyer Nationale, si les victimes sans 
foyer de la persécution ne pouvaient y être admises?” 
39 Perelman is not alone in using a sociological perspective to understand anti-Semitism. See, more recently Fein, ed.  In her preface, 
Fein insists that a sociological perspective is, for one, diachronic : “The sociological perspective requires complementary historical and 
comparative analyses to answer the question it poses : How is antisemitism similar to and dissimilar from other cases of inter-group 
hostility?” (ix). Unlike Herzl, Perelman, and more recently Dershowitz (8) who see it as a problem for Jews as a group, Arendt in 1935 
writes that “The Jewish question becomes a problem of the individual Jew” (“Original Assimilation” in The Jewish Writings 23). 
40 “La Question juive” 55: “En fait, l’antisémitisme n’est qu’un cas particulier d’un phénomène très répandu, qui est celui de 
l’opposition des groupes. C’est le caractéristique de tout groupe social, quelqu’il soit, de s’opposer à d’autres groupes, surtout à ceux 
de même espèce. Ce phénomène, dont nous avons signalé un cas particulier dans l’opposition du christianisme au judaïsme, se 
présente courrammet non seulement entre groupes religieux, mais aussi entre gropes nationaux, professionnels, sportifs, etc.”  
41 He reiterates the problem of Jews being without a past, as posed by Arendt: “Once they have been deprived of their own past, 
present reality begins to reveal its power” (“The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question” in The Jewish Writings, 16). 
42 In his 1935 review “Une conception sociologique”, Perelman states quite simply that it is anti-Semitism that obliges Jews to become 
aware of a Jewish question: “C’est l’antisémitisme, sous ses diverses formes, qui oblige la plupart des Juifs à se rendre compte d’une 
question juive” (51). 
43 “La Question juive”: “De tous les camps d’Europe, à travers toutes les frontières, des milliers de réfugiés affluent vers les rives de la 
Terre Promise. Ils n’ont plus rien à perdre et la Palestine constitue leur seul espoir. Les Anglais ont mobilisé une grande partie de leur 
flotte pour faire la chasse aux petits bateaux qui, de toute part, amènent des Juifs désespérés dans le pays de leurs ancêtres. Les 
bateaux sont confisqués, les gens sont envoyés dans des camps à Chypre, mais le flot continue….” 
44 “La Question juive” 56-57: “Mais alors que les idées libérales avaient favorisé en Europe occidentale un fort courant d’assimilation, 
l’hostilité dont ils étaient entourés en Europe orientale contribua à rendre vivant l’idéal national, dont le souffle parcourt les écrits 
religieux juifs.” [“But whereas in Western Europe liberal ideas had favored a strong current of assimilation, the hostility with which 
[Jews] were surrounded in Eastern Europe contributed to bringing to life the ideal of having a nation, the spirit of which runs through 
Jewish religious writings.”] 
failure of assimilation to Zionism, and, as we will see below, how Perelman will sometime after 1948 consider 
the State of Israel as a solution to the conflict of norms and values experienced by assimilated Jews. And yet if 
Perelman determines that the emigration of Eastern European Jewish refugees to Palestine is the solution to 
the Jewish Question in 1946, nowhere does he propose that all Jews must or should emigrate there. In other 
words, Perelman seems to craft a dual response to the Jewish Question, one of which still seems to involve 
assimilation.  
We cannot state with certainty that Perelman is proposing in “The Jewish Question” assimilation for 
some Jews; his overt and expressed goal is to find a way for Jews from Eastern Europe to be able to emigrate 
safely and legally. And yet, it may helpful to remember that despite all they did for Jewish emigration to 
Palestine, the Perelmans themselves did not choose to emigrate. Indeed, Perelman was tied to his identity as 
both Belgian and Jewish; being faithful simultaneously to both Jewish and Belgian values shapes his thoughts 
on assimilation, and vice versa. Perelman’s personal response to anti-Semitism can be described by the 
conception of “double fidelité,” which Frank identifies as “an elegant solution to the Enlightenment 
paradox” that was “translated into the philosophical aspirations of the NRP” (“Jewish Rhetoric” 80, 88).45 If, 
as I believe, double fidelity fashions a coherent and rhetorical response to the anti-Semitic form of 
assimilation that compelled Jews to forgo Judaism in order to embrace universal values, it is also very present 
in its absence in the conclusion to “The Jewish Question.” 
“The Jewish Question” will inform Perelman’s later work on assimilation. In an undated essay clearly 
written after 1948, he once again takes up the question of assimilation, and once again from a sociological 
perspective. The war, and the difficulties of emigration to Palestine, had taken its toll, and Perelman, no 
longer optimistically reinventing assimilation as he did in 1935, instead turns to Zionism. In this, he recalls 
Arendt’s view, who already in the late 1930s had made of Zionism a direct result of the failure of 
assimilation.46 He explains that when Jews live freely in a culture that is nevertheless not their own, their 
norms end up being in competition with national norms. The State of Israel, as a result, helps to create a 
uniform set of Jewish national values: “from the Jewish point of view, the incontestable superiority of the 
State of Israel is that the norms that it formulates are those that are usual in a national community that is 
predominantly Jewish.”47 Perelman concludes the essay by asserting that working against assimilation is a 
means of protecting the Jewish community:  
Insofar as it should safeguard the essential of Judaism, the struggle against 
assimilation thus coincides with the fight for the traditional values of Judaism, 
which implies, for Jewish dignity, the knowledge of its past; for the survival of the 
Jewish community, the embodiment of an experience of culture and of a message 
whose impact, unique in the history of mankind, is universal.48 
In this post-1948 essay, Perelman thus no longer describes assimilation as having two forms: one 
which is psychologically (and potentially more) damaging; the other which affirms the value of Jewish culture 
and what it has given to the world. Instead, he proposes that the State of Israel offers Jews a means to escape 
the contradiction that is assimilation. Rather than being caught between the press of the ostensibly universal 
values of a non-Jewish national culture and the pull of traditional Jewish values, Jews living in Israel may 
experience a seamless merging of values. 
April 1962 finds Perelman lecturing on “Rationalism and Assimilation.”49 In many ways, this lecture 
is explicit precisely there where the Traité is circumspect. For example, in this lecture he retraces the history of 
the French Revolution’s emphasis on universalism as a marker of Enlightenment rationality; moreover, and 																																																								
45 As its title indicates, Schreiber’s unpublished analytical biography of Perelman insists on this notion of double fidelité. 
46 She argues that “Zionism is the heir of assimilation: arose as assimilation foundered, and is consequence of a faded emancipation” 
(“Antisemitism” in The Jewish Writings 56). 
47 “Réflections sur l’assimilation” (ca. 1949): “Et, en fait, la supériorité indéniable, au point de vue juif, de l’Etat d’Israël, c’est que les 
normes qu’il élabore, sont celles qui sont normales dans une communauté nationale à prédominance juive.” 
48 “Réflections sur l’assimilation” (ca. 1949): “La lutte contre l’assimilation dans la mesure où elle doit sauvegarder l’essentiel du 
judaïsme coïncide donc avec la lutte pour les valeurs traditionnelles du judaïsme, qui implique la connaissance de son passé, pour la 
dignité juive, pour la survie de la communauté juive, incarnation d’une expérience de culture et d’un message d’une portée universelle 
unique dans l’histoire de l’humanité.” 
49 Although I do not know yet where Perelman gave this lecture, I believe it was most likely the ULB, as Perelman stresses its motto, 
“scientia vincere tenebras.” His notes are just that, written in bits of phrases rather than in complete sentences; as a result, I will include 
excerpts within parenthesis in the main body of the text.  
he draws out how universalism and rationalism lead to the assimilation Jews, particularly those who were 
educated. He invokes Moses Mendelssohn’s advice to “be Jewish at home, and a man in the street” [“sois Juif 
à la maison et homme à la rue”], and in very vivid language, describes rationality under the realm of 
assimilation as like a Japanese person abandoning his kimono: [“comme au Japon, le rationalisme s’habille à 
l’Européenne et abandonne sa tenue de kimono”] (5).50 The bulk of Perelman’s lecture thus sketches out how 
the Enlightenment and the French Revolution offered Jews only the possibility of assimilating and denying 
their Judaism. He thus overtly ties assimilation to “anti-Judaism,” the term with which he describes Voltaire 
and Diderot: the Jews were able to be equal, he writes, “on the condition that they ceased being different” 
[“Egaux, à condition de cesser d’être différents”]. 
Notably, his conclusion in this lecture hinges precisely on the notion of Judaism as different. In fact, 
Perelman points to traditional Jewish values emphasizing the well-being of all humanity; he invokes the 
originality of a rationalist Judaism that, unlike the ideals of the French Revolution, does not require a break 
with the past.51 Perelman’s conclusion not only promotes pluralism, then, but also prods the Jews of both 
Israel and the diaspora to open up toward the universal. If he warns that Jewish thinkers can no longer 
neglect the social and political realities of Israel, he nevertheless reminds them that Jews have a particular 
responsibility to develop the instances of natural solidarity they so value on a universal scale (“Partir de 
l’humanisme des solidarités naturelles, les développer à l’échelle universelle”). If this lecture confirms the tie 
of assimilation to the French Revolution, it reverses the requirement that all rational Jews should be forced to 
abandon their differences and their particularities in order to be included within the ideal of universalism. 
Indeed, here Perelman argues that all rational Jews should use their values, especially the Jewish value of 
solidarity, in order to benefit humanity as a whole.52 Assimilation seems to have once again been reshaped in 
this lecture, for Perelman calls the historical moment propitious for Jews of Israel and of the diaspora both to 
open towards the diaspora, and into universalism (“Situation historique particulièrement favorable. Israël et 
diaspora s’ouvrant vers diaspora, s’ouvre vers l’universel”). 
This lecture is the last work that I have thus far found in which Perelman dwells at length on the 
notion of assimilation; it offers us, then, something of a lesson with which I would like to conclude. But first, 
what exactly have we learned from this diachronic survey of Perelman’s thought on assimilation? This lecture 
of 1962, like the essays before it, establishes how for decades Perelman (alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca) 
carefully attended to the ideals of rationalism and universalism inherited from the Enlightment and the 
French Revolution, acknowledging and condemning their anti-Semitic bases and consequences, all the while 
insisting upon their potential for pluralism and nuance. This lecture, with the earlier essays and even the 
understated Traité, also makes evident how assimilation is an important (if at times veiled) touchstone for the 
rhetorical theory of the Traité and the NRP broadly speaking. Further, this lecture, like the other essays, 
reveals how Perelman’s thoughts on assimilation were very much anchored in their respective time and space, 
and thus respond to specific historical contexts and even changing personal ideologies.  
What is most striking, and most significant about this lecture, however, is how Perelman ties the 
identity of Judaism as a social group to a universalism stripped of its anti-Semitism. If in 1935, Perelman 
partially dissociates assimilation from anti-Semitism, offering Jews the possibility of choosing a new form of 
being in the world and an assimilation of their own making, in 1962, his view of assimilation has evolved: he 
calls his readers to a dynamic and even lived experience of rhetorical dissociation in which assimilation is no 
longer simply marked by, and Zionism is no longer simply a response to, anti-Semitism. The Judaism of Israel 
and the diaspora alike, he declares, is endowed with universal and humanistic values; its contributions are 
universal in nature. To say that the NRP responds to anti-Semitism is, then, to recognize Perelman as 
engaged—philosophically and personally—not only in the dilemma of assimilation, but also in its creative and 
dissociative reinvention. 																																																								
50 See Altmann on Mendelssohn’s notion that Judaism was not in conflict with the secular state (465-468). Arendt calls Mendelssohn’s 
assimilation “genuine,” and remarks that “…Mendelssohn stressed above all else the isolation of each individual in being able to think 
for himself (“The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question,” in The Jewish Writings 3, 10). 
51 Perelman may be responding here to Mendelssohn’s and G.E. Lessing’s different ways of seeing history and rationalism. See 
Arendt’s account in “The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question” in The Jewish Writings. 
52 In this Perelman anticipates the recent argument of Jonathan Sacks, who proposes that two issues— identity without universality, 
and its opposite, universality without identity—must be addressed in order to stem religious violence. See especially 39–43. 
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